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THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE–JUSTICE SERVED OR 
JUSTICE THWARTED? 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
BRONX COUNTY  
People v. Pinckney1 
(decided September 9, 2011) 
  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
While performing general law enforcement duties, New York 
City Police Officer Joel Gomez responded to the scene of a motor 
vehicle accident to investigate.2  An eyewitness advised Officer Go-
mez that defendant, Sincere Pinckney, caused the mishap by sides-
wiping three parked vehicles.3  Officer Gomez approached defendant 
to inquire about the accident and requested that defendant remove his 
hands from his pockets.4  In doing so, Officer Gomez obtained evi-
dence collateral to the initially suspected crime.5  Despite complying 
with the request promptly and without protest, defendant later con-
tested the inculpating evidence revealed by his conduct.6  That is, two 
bags of illegally possessed marijuana fell to the ground in plain 
sight.7  As warranted by the exigent circumstances,8 Officer Gomez 
performed a standard pat down of defendant and asked for his driv-
 
1 No. 75334C-10, 2011 WL 4011362, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 9, 2011). 
2 Id. at *2. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *1-2. 
7 Id. at *2. 
8 Id.; see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (observing the renowned 
exigency exception whereby police may validate an otherwise unlawful search and seizure 
upon demonstrating that their conduct was justified by ―the need ‗to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence‘ ‖ (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))). 
1
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er‘s license.9  Upon disclosing that his license was suspended, defen-
dant was formally arrested and taken into police custody.10 
Defense counsel moved to suppress both the marijuana ob-
tained at the scene and a third bag discovered during a precinct inven-
tory search of defendant and his personal belongings.11  It was undis-
puted that defendant was lawfully arrested in violation of New York 
Vehicle and Traffic Law, sections 509.112 and 511.1(a).13  Yet, con-
struing the seized marijuana as ―fruit of the poisonous tree,‖14 the 
court suppressed the evidence that supported the possession charge.15  
The court‘s decision was twofold–considering both the United States 
Supreme Court precedent, excluding evidence irreparably tainted by 
its unlawful procurement and the more protective approach to per-
missible privacy encroachments as adopted by New York State.16 
 
9 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *2. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at *1-2.  Defense counsel also had challenged the constitutionality of admitting de-
fendant‘s statement, ―I don‘t have a license,‖ but this issue is not further explored because 
the court held that it was ―admissible, as it was made in response to a lawful level one re-
quest for information.‖  Id. at *5. 
12 Id. at *1; see generally N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 509.1 (McKinney 2009) (―[N]o per-
son shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state . . . unless he is 
duly licensed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.‖). 
13 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *1; see generally N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 511.1(a) 
(McKinney 2006) (―A person is guilty of the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a 
motor vehicle in the third degree when such person operates a motor vehicle . . . while know-
ing or having reason to know that such person‘s license or privilege . . . is suspended, re-
voked or otherwise withdrawn‖). 
14 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *5 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 
341 (1939)).  For a more complete understanding of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine 
to which the court refers in Pinckney, see Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Failed Constitutional Meta-
phors: The Wall of Separation and the Penumbra, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 459 (2011).  The au-
thor observed that: 
In the law of criminal procedure, the doctrine of the ―fruit of the poison-
ous tree‖ has played a significant role in defining the constitutionally 
based exclusionary rule.  According to the doctrine, evidence is inad-
missible when it is obtained in an illegal arrest, unreasonable search, or 
coercive interrogation.  The initial illegal evidence is the ―poisonous 
tree‖ and the secondary evidence is the ―tainted fruit.‖ 
Id. at 460. 
15 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *1; see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKin-
ney 2011) (―A person is guilty of unlawful possession of marihuana when he knowingly and 
unlawfully possesses marihuana.‖). 
16 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *2 (noting that the New York Constitution is more pro-
tective of the right to privacy than the United States Constitution, and thus, vast differences 
surface in the context of search and seizure litigation); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (explaining that a ―conviction [secured] by means of unlawful seizures 
2
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2012] THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE 717 
Nearly a century ago, the United States Supreme Court con-
strained search and seizure jurisprudence to expressly prohibit the 
prosecutorial use of evidence seized through an intrusive and unrea-
sonable search.17  The federal exclusionary rule is a judicial mandate 
that has since been incorporated to the states.18  It is meant to ensure 
citizens‘ entitlement to freely exercise their rights to privacy and se-
curity granted by the United States Constitution,19 and in effect, 
serves to protect parallel rights set forth under state constitutions.20  
However, federal and state courts generally agree that ―exigent cir-
cumstances [may] necessitate an exception to the warrant require-
 
and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to un-
warranted practices [is] destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution‖). 
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States 
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under 
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, 
and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of 
law.  This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, 
and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all en-
trusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. 
Id. at 391-92; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1920) (re-
versing judgment against defendant because the Government obtained the inculpating evi-
dence through an illegal search and seizure).  For an example of the invasions that prompted 
the Supreme Court to adopt the federal exclusionary rule, see Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 390 
(observing that ―without a shadow of authority [the Government] went to the office of [de-
fendant‘s] company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers, and documents found 
there‖ and the ―indictment was framed based upon the knowledge thus obtained‖). 
17 See Weeks, supra note 16, at 398 (noting that Fourth Amendment precludes the admis-
sion of evidence obtained in a manner that directly undermines the constitutional rights of an 
accused). 
18 See infra note 54 (noting the ultimate extension of the exclusionary rule to the states); 
but see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (resisting the need to mandate state com-
pliance with the exclusionary rule, considering ―[h]ow such arbitrary conduct should be 
checked, what remedies against it should be afforded, the means by which the right should 
be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered from an al-
lowable range of judgment on issues not susceptible to quantitative solution‖). 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖). 
20 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖) 
(noting that the federal exclusionary rule is a procedural right assertable by those persons, 
who have suffered an infringement by the state government upon their fundamental constitu-
tionally protected rights to privacy and security). 
3
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ment,‖ requiring adherence to a reasonableness standard.21  While 
evidence seized ―by an unconstitutional search is [presumably] inad-
missible,‖22 whether suppression is appropriate depends on whether 
the circumstances caused an elevated suspicion of criminality, war-
ranting greater intrusiveness than the law inherently authorizes.23 
Although invocation of the exclusionary rule marked a para-
mount change in search and seizure law, its variant applications at 
both the state and federal levels have created an influx of contradicto-
ry and controversial opinions.24  For instance, the court in Pinckney 
recognized that ―New York has adopted standards considerably more 
protective of individual liberty than federal precedent mandates.‖25  
Thus, adhering to a heightened standard of scrutiny of law enforce-
ment conduct, the court invoked the test used by the New York Court 
of Appeals to analyze two actions employed by Officer Gomez.26  
First, because his official duties obliged him to investigate the allega-
 
21 United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1981) (―[O]ur jurisprudence 
has bent to accommodate [] unusual circumstances.‖); People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 
571 (N.Y. 1976) (―[V]arious intensities of police action are justifiable as the precipitating 
and attendant factors increase in weight and competence.‖). 
22 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *2. 
23 Compare People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 878 (N.Y. 1975) (observing that ―the 
common-law authority of the police to make investigative inquiries . . . does not give the po-
lice a license to violate the Constitution‖ and will not justify a search and seizure conducted 
because of ―vague suspicion or as means of harassment,‖ with DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 567 
(demonstrating that ―[c]ontrary to the appellant‘s assertions, Cantor should not be read as a 
blanket prohibition of all police-citizen encounters conducted in the absence of probable 
cause of reasonable suspicion based on concrete observations‖); see also Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (―The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks 
the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his 
shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.‖).  Rather, the United States 
Supreme Court has established that ―[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to de-
termine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more informa-
tion, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.‖  Id. at 
146 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).  
24 Compare United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1990) (suppressing 
material evidence needed to sustain a drug dealer‘s conviction discounting the officer‘s al-
leged suspicions for taking immediate police action), with Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 
132 (1954) (admitting evidence seized by a destructive and unlawful search of a home with 
the desperate justification that the officers did not assault defendant while conducting the 
search).  For an in-depth burden-benefit discussion of the exclusionary rule‘s impact on 
criminal procedure and constitutional law, see William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of 
the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 443 (1997). 
25 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *2. 
26 Id. at *3 (considering primarily whether Officer Gomez was justified in first asking de-
fendant to remove his hands from his pockets, and thereafter, asking defendant for his driv-
er‘s license). 
4
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tion that defendant caused the ―fender-bender,‖ the court found that 
Officer Gomez had an ―objective, credible, and articulable reason‖ to 
approach defendant.27  Thus, the officer‘s inquiry of whether defen-
dant possessed a license was ―a permissible level-one inquiry.‖28 
Next, evaluating the ―directive to the defendant that he take 
his hands out of his pockets,‖ the court concluded that Officer Gomez 
made a level-two inquiry.29  This second level emulates ―the com-
mon-law right of inquiry,‖30 the constitutionality of which is contin-
gent upon a ―founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.‖31  
However, the court in Pinckney clarified that under the New York 
standard, conduct that is ―susceptible of innocent as well as culpable 
interpretation[s]‖ will not suffice to permit a level-two inquiry.32 
 
27 Id. at *3-4 (noting that the court subsequently made clear that the limited knowledge 
possessed by Officer Gomez ―d[id] not on its own suggest criminality‖). 
28 Id. at *3. 
29 Id.; see DeBour, 352 N.E. at 567 (―The basic purpose of the constitutional protections 
against unlawful searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of each and 
every person against all arbitrary intrusions by government.‖).  New York State uses a thre-
shold test to first measure the level of an intrusion, and subsequently, determine whether ―the 
Constitution has been violated and [or] the aggrieved party may invoke the exclusionary rule 
or appropriate forms of civil redress.‖  Id. at 567-68.  For a comparison of the ―threshold 
test‖ applied by the federal courts, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 11 (justifying the federal test used 
to measure intrusiveness, the Supreme Court stated that the Fourth Amendment impliedly 
mandated ―a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected 
personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce 
upon the agents of the State the commands of the Constitution‖); but see id. at 15, as Chief 
Justice Warren further advised that ―a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary 
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may 
exact a high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.‖ (observing that 
―[n]o judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we 
can only judge the facts of the case before us‖); PRISCILLA H. MACHADO ZOTTI, INJUSTICE 
FOR ALL: MAPP VS. OHIO AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 166 (Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 
New York 2005). 
The exclusionary rule, seemingly a ―bright line‖ one, would be subject to 
interpretations of ―context‖ as the Chief mentioned.  The diversity of en-
counter between the citizenry and law enforcement would lead to the 
eventual creation of rules and exceptions to make the exclusionary rule 
pragmatically workable.  For example, the much-heralded Terry decision 
in which Warren made his above-mentioned comment, focused on rea-
sonableness of stopping a suspicious individual without a warrant, yet al-
lowing the incriminating evidence to be admissible in court. 
Id. 
30 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *3 (citing DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 572). 
31 Id. (citing DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 572). 
32 Id. at *3-4 (citing DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 567).  The New York Court of Appeals ex-
plained that just as ―[t]he police may not justify a stop by a subsequently acquired suspicion 
5
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Ultimately deciding that the car accident was not a lawful 
predicate to ―order a civilian to remove his hands from his pockets,‖33 
the court premised its ruling on two findings.  First, the court con-
strued the police command, inculpating defendant on the possession 
charge as beyond the scope of the intrusion permissible under the cir-
cumstances.34  Further, it explained that the sequence in which the in-
vestigation transpired was improper and unlawful.35  On cross-
examination, Officer Gomez admitted that ―he first directed the de-
fendant to remove his hands and then asked for the license.‖36  There-
 
resulting from the stop,‖ they may neither attempt to ―validate a search by what it produces.‖  
DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 566-67. 
33 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *3 (citing People v. Boodle, 391 N.E.2d 1329, 1330 
(N.Y. 1979)).  In Boodle, the court noted that ―[w]hile the defendant‘s entering the police car 
may not have been coerced, the command to keep his hands exposed demonstrates his free-
dom of movement was significantly restrained.‖  Boodle, 391 N.E.2d at 1331 (suppressing 
heroin illegally seized by police absent a founded suspicion connecting defendant to a 
crime). 
34 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *3-4 (finding no reasonable relation between the initial 
vehicular investigation and the order for defendant to reveal his hands); see DeBour, 352 
N.E.2d at 571 (―[A]ny inquiry into the propriety of police conduct must weigh the interfe-
rence it entails against the precipitating and attending conditions.‖). 
35 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *2 (noting that it was detrimental to the prosecutorial 
case that Officer Gomez ordered defendant to remove his hands from his pockets before in-
quiring about a driver‘s license).  Thus, it is worth mentioning that if Officer Gomez had first 
inquired about defendant‘s license, he would have obtained legal cause to place defendant 
under arrest and the marijuana would have been lawfully revealed in either a search incident 
to arrest or an inventory search at the precinct.  Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (explain-
ing that in order to justify a search upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the po-
lice must perceive ―unusual conduct‖ and believe that a suspect ―may be armed and present-
ly dangerous,‖ and even then, the subsequent search is circumscribed to ―a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing . . . in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him‖), with United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (noting that ―stan-
dards traditionally governing a search incident to a lawful arrest are not, therefore, com-
muted to the stricter Terry standards by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of 
the particular crime for which the arrest is made‖); see Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 
(1983).  In Lafayette, the Supreme Court established that: 
[C]onsistent with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for police to 
search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the 
routine administrative procedure at a police stationhouse incident to 
booking and jailing the suspect.  The justification for such searches does 
not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of a warrant is imma-
terial to the reasonableness of the search.  
Id. at 643; United States v. Gorski, 852 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1988) (observing that ―a rou-
tine procedure incident to booking and detention of a suspect‖ is sufficient grounds to invoke 
the inevitable discovery rule). 
36 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *3; but see id. (noting that the court discounted a clear 
discrepancy in Officer Gomez‘s testimony having first ―testified on direct examination that 
6
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fore, because nothing atypical occurred to warrant what the court 
characterized as an invasive inquiry, it reasoned that ―its fruit must be 
discarded.‖37 
Most troubling with the resolution of this matter was the 
court‘s erroneous interpretation of the inevitable discovery rule and 
the prosecution‘s unequivocal failure to meet its burden.38  The ex-
clusionary rule evolved as a procedural mechanism to halt the gradual 
diminution of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment; 
nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court and the states employ 
a garden-variety of exceptions to admit traditionally barred evi-
dence.39  Most pertinent to the present discussion is the inevitable 
discovery rule, which authorizes the use of inculpating evidence un-
lawfully procured upon the government‘s showing that the evidence 
would have inevitably been obtained by lawful means.40 
In Pinckney, a proper invocation of the inevitable discovery 
rule should have enabled the prosecution ―to show the legality of the 
police conduct.‖41  Indeed, the court noted that ―the New York Court 
of Appeals narrowed the inevitable discovery doctrine to exclude 
primary evidence, applying it only to secondary evidence.‖42  Thus, 
the two bags of marijuana retrieved by result of the ―command to the 
defendant to remove his hands from his pockets was unlawful and 
any evidence recovered as a result‖ required suppression.43  However, 
contrary to the court‘s holding, the rule as currently applied in New 
 
he asked defendant for his license immediately upon approaching him, and instructed him to 
remove his hands from his pockets only after the defendant informed him that he did not 
have one‖). 
37 Id. at *4. 
38 Id. at *2 (requiring the People to merely establish that ―the circumstances authorized the 
officer‘s behavior‖). 
39 See infra note 67 (observing the attenuation principle) and note 83 (observing the inde-
pendent source doctrine). 
40 See infra note 92 (observing the inevitable discovery rule, which is the turning point of 
the forthcoming analysis). 
41 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *2 (citing People v. Baldwin, 250 N.E.2d 62, 64 (N.Y. 
1969)). 
42 Id. at *4; see also People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1987) (noting that the 
court limited the application of the inevitable discovery rule to secondary evidence, explain-
ing that ―failing to exclude wrongfully obtained primary evidence‖ would consequentially 
condone police misconduct). 
43 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *4 (affirming the established precedent that ―evidence 
. . . revealed as a direct result of . . . unlawful police action . . . is tainted and must be sup-
pressed on defendant‘s motion‖ (quoting Boodle, 391 N.E.2d at 1331)). 
7
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York State, indicates that suppression of the third bag of marijuana 
was an error.44  Because defendant was unlicensed, his arrest was 
forthcoming despite the initial discovery of marijuana in his posses-
sion.45  Thus, the third bag of marijuana, retrieved in a lawful search 
conducted incident to an inevitable arrest,46 should have been sus-
tained at trial. 
Recognizing that the speculative operation of the inevitable 
discovery rule has provoked controversy, this case note observes how 
its inconsistent application is slowly eroding the Fourth Amendment.  
The United States Supreme Court is bound to accommodate compet-
ing interests in search and seizure jurisprudence by adopting novel 
exceptions to evade the consequences of the exclusionary rule.  Nev-
ertheless, this case note posits that unless and until the Supreme 
Court adequately defines the scope of the inevitable discovery rule, 
New York State and the circuit courts alike, will undermine the ex-
clusionary rule‘s inherent purpose–to deter police misconduct in the 
interests of advancing the constitutional rights to privacy and securi-
 
44 Id. at *4-5 (questioning the court‘s interpretation of the inevitable discovery exception, 
as the record demonstrated that third bag of marijuana was not ―in fact a primary result of 
the illegal police conduct and therefore not subject to the inevitable discovery rule‖).  For a 
general preface of the controversial application of the exclusionary rule see WALTER P. 
SIGNORELLI, THE CONSTABLE HAS BLUNDERED: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, CRIME, AND 
CORRUPTION 43 (Carolina Academic Press 2010). 
Since 1980, state courts have increasingly exercised their prerogative to 
apply the exclusionary rule in more expansive ways than the Supreme 
Court required.  These state courts, at trial and appellate levels, are 
where tens of thousands of exclusionary rule cases are decided, and 
many of the decisions rendered in these courts have not followed the Su-
preme Court path to moderation but instead have applied the rule in ab-
solutist terms.  Consequently, in those states, the exclusionary rule is 
employed today as much as or more than ever, and it continues to un-
dermine the goals of the criminal justice system. 
Id. 
45 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *2. 
46 Id. (noting that this bag was derivative evidence to that which carried the initial taint of 
the unlawful search).  For a comprehensive discussion explaining how the inevitable discov-
ery rule varies in its application to primary and derivative evidence, see 6 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, ET AL., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4(a) (4th ed. 2004).  Compare LAFAVE, at 255 
(―This ‗direct‘ or ‗primary‘ evidence includes not only the physical evidence discovered but 
also photographs taken of the physical evidence as a consequence of the search for or seizure 
of it.‖), with id. at 265-66 (observing the controversial debate between courts and commenta-
tors, as to whether to circumscribe the scope of the inevitable discovery rule to secondary 
evidence; nevertheless, some jurisdictions have exploited the rule ―to save primary evidence 
which would otherwise have been excluded‖). 
8
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ty, as secured for all citizens whether innocent, guilty, or accused. 
This case note proposes that the exclusionary rule, its excep-
tions, and the protections enshrined in the Fourth Amendment are ca-
pable of an active coexistence.  New York State courts and several 
circuit courts have employed manageable ways to address police ille-
gality without undermining the prospects of obtaining a criminal 
conviction.  While prophylactic rules create hurdles for the judiciary, 
efficiency may not take precedence at the expense of the Constitu-
tion.  The United States Supreme Court is versed in the countervail-
ing views in this area, and further, equipped to resolve the issue of 
whether and to what degree the government may render a police hall 
pass to interfere with citizens‘ privacy.  Thus, this case note advo-
cates that the Supreme Court should revisit and redefine the contours 
of the exclusionary rule to guarantee that all courts respect and 
uphold the Fourth Amendment to the same extent. 
 
II.  THE FEDERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE: DEFINING THE 
CONTOURS WITH EXCEPTIONS 
At first glance, the actual ramifications of the holding in 
Pinckney might appear nominal.  However, the aggregate impact of 
the erroneous application of the exclusionary rule encumbers the 
judicial process47 and undermines the constitutional guarantees of the 
 
47 See, e.g., Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *3-4 (noting that the court‘s failure to impose 
a penalty on defendant for unlawful marijuana possession conveys a societal message that 
crime-related incidents will go unpunished by the courts); see also United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  In Leon, Justice Brennan, with whom Justice 
Marshall joined in dissenting, professed concerns that: 
Ten years ago in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), I ex-
pressed the fear that the Court‘s decision ‗may signal that a majority of 
my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door to evi-
dence secured by official lawlessness still further and abandon altogether 
the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases.‘  Since then, in case af-
ter case, I have witnessed the Court‘s gradual but determined strangula-
tion of the rule.  It now appears that the Court‘s victory over the Fourth 
Amendment is complete.  That today‘s decisions represent pièce de 
résistance of the Court‘s past efforts cannot be doubted, for today the 
Court sanctions the use in the prosecution‘s case in chief of illegally ob-
tained evidence against the individual whose rights have been violated—
a result that had previously been thought to be foreclosed. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 928; United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 629 (1980) (Brennan, J. and 
Marshall, J., dissenting joined in part one by Justices Stewart and Stevens) (critiquing the 
9
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Fourth Amendment.48  The Fourth Amendment declares: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.49 
The exclusionary rule, though it is not a constitutional requirement, 
was formulated to safeguard the Fourth Amendment.50  In Mapp v. 
 
Court‘s ―trend to depreciate the constitutional protections guaranteed [to] the criminally ac-
cused‖); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 442 U.S. 31, 41 (1979) (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (―[T]he police conduct, whether or not authorized by state law, exceeded 
the bounds set by the Constitution and violated respondent‘s Fourth Amendment rights.‖); 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 463-64 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (―If state police 
officials can effectively crack down on gambling law violators by the simple expedient of 
violating their constitutional rights and turning illegally seized evidence over to Internal 
Revenue Service agents on the proverbial ‗silver platter,‘ then the deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is wholly frustrated.‖); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560 (1975) 
(Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting) (―Today‘s formulation extended to all search-and-
seizure cases would inevitably introduce the same uncertainty, by adding a new layer of fact-
finding in deciding motions to suppress in the already heavily burdened federal courts.‖). 
48 Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-30.  Although ―the nature of crime itself changed dramatically 
since the Fourth Amendment became part of the Nation‘s fundamental law in 1971,‖ Justice 
Brennan rejected the reasoning, which the majority posited, emphasizing that ―what the 
Framer‘s understood then remains true today–that the task of combating crime and convict-
ing the guilty will in every era seem of such critical and pressing concern that we may be 
lured by temptations of expediency into forsaking our commitment to protecting individual 
liberty and privacy.‖  Id. 
49 See supra note 19. 
50 See Robert F. Maguire, How To Unpoison The Fruit–The Fourth Amendment And The 
Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 307, 308 (1964) (―Simply stated, the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to ensure full compliance with the fourth amendment to the Constitu-
tion by law enforcement officials.‖). 
The underlying rationale is that the civil liability of such officials for tor-
tious invasions of the personal rights guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment has proved inadequate as a sanction where such invasions can ef-
fectively be used by these officials to assist them in the discharge of their 
official responsibilities of the investigation of crimes and the prosecution 
of criminals.  It is believed that the exclusionary rule serves not only to 
deter unlawful conduct, negligent or otherwise, in this area but also to 
provide an added incentive for full compliance with all applicable rules 
of law.  It is obvious that the rule confers a substantial benefit upon the 
defendant who successfully invokes it, but it is important to keep in 
mind that this bonanza is a regrettable by-product of the rule and not its 
objective. 
10
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Ohio,51 the Supreme Court remarked that the exclusionary rule was 
an ―imperative of judicial integrity,‖ resting its decision on traditional 
constitutional and evidentiary principles.52  While previously holding 
that compliance with the exclusionary rule ―was not required of the 
States, that they could apply such sanctions as they choose,‖53 the 
Court in Mapp rejected this reasoning.54  Instead, the Court estab-
 
Id. 
51 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  The Court acknowledged that the exclusionary 
rule was ―clear, specific, and constitutionally required–even if judic[i]ally implied–[as a] 
deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been 
reduced to ‗a form of words.‘ ‖  Id. at 659 (quoting Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392)).  But see 
THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 5 (2009) (observing that 
a vast dichotomy of opinions exist regarding the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule, 
and the advantages and consequences resulting from its unpredictable interpretation).  The 
author observes: 
While members of the Court understand that the exclusionary rule plays 
an important role in enforcing the Fourth Amendment and stopping po-
lice from violating the Fourth Amendment, they often dislike the costs of 
the rule‘s application.  These costs mean that probative evidence which 
directly point towards a person‘s guilt will not be allowed to be entered 
at trial as evidence and the guilty may go free.  Due to this cost, the 
Court has often tried to avoid the necessity of applying the rule in Fourth 
Amendment cases.  When there is a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
the Court is put in the position of trying to determine what brings more 
harm on society, the violation of the law by criminals of the violation of 
the law by the government.  It also brings forth the issue of how society 
can best stop both types of violations from taking place in the future. 
MCINNIS, supra, at 5-6. 
52 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (quoting United States v. Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) 
(―Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example.‖).  Thus, the Court in Mapp reasoned that ―[n]othing can de-
stroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disre-
gard of the charter of its own existence.‖  Id. 
53 Id. at 669 (Douglas, J., concurring) (observing that the Court‘s decision in Weeks to 
limit the exclusionary rule to its preconceived federal application ―had the necessary votes to 
carry the day,‖ it nevertheless ―was not the voice of reason or principle‖).  Justice Douglas 
emphasized that permitting a state court to raise ―evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment‖ against an accused, undermines its value and dilutes its intended meaning, in 
such a way that it ―might as well be stricken from the Constitution.‖  Id. at 669-70 (quoting 
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393). 
54 Id. at 656-57 (majority opinion) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states upon ob-
servation that ―as to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to 
the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from con-
victions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an ‗intimate relation‘ in their perpetua-
tion‖).  Raising the question: ―Why should not the same rule apply to what is tantamount to 
coerced testimony by way of unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers, effect, documents, 
etc.?‖ the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment must confer the same rights upon all 
persons.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656. 
11
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lished that no federal or state court could enter a conviction upon evi-
dence unlawfully seized, as it would compromise the notion of justice 
to rely on ―unconstitutional evidence.‖55 
In Mapp, the police forced entry into a private residence de-
spite the homeowner‘s clear ―refus[al] to admit them without a search 
warrant.‖56  From the inception of this misconduct and at trial, the of-
ficers involved apparently saw nothing offensive about their action, 
volunteering that they pried open doors to gain entrance.57  However, 
condemning such lawless behavior, the Court observed that evidence 
was obtained only after ―ransacking through every room and piece of 
furniture, while [defendant] sat, a prisoner in her own bedroom.‖58 
The Court broadened the scope of the exclusionary rule in 
Mapp in an effort ―to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty 
in the only effectively available way–by removing the incentive to 
disregard it.‖59  In turn, the ruling imposed an onerous burden on po-
lice, bearing the risk that evidence tainted by illegality would be sup-
pressed and defeat the prosecution‘s case.60  Endeavoring to rebut the 
―technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person,‖ the Court 
explained that the historical evolution of ―criminal law proves that to-
lerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring 
effectiveness.‖61 
To control the net effect of bitter dissenting opinions,62 so-
 
55 Id. at 657 (―The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary 
to, although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence—the very least 
that together they assure in either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional 
evidence.‖). 
56 Id. at 644. 
57 Id. at 644 n.2. 
58 Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
59 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (majority opinion) (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213) (noting that 
by unanimous vote, the Court previously held that ―the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers‖).  
The Court in Mapp explained that given ―the substantive protections of due process to all 
constitutionally unreasonable searches–state or federal–it was logically and constitutionally 
necessary that the exclusion doctrine–an essential part of the right to privacy–be also insisted 
upon as an essential ingredient of the right.‖  Id. at 655-56. 
60 Id. at 648 (―The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punish-
ment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles 
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in 
the fundamental law of the land.‖ (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393)). 
61 Id. at 658 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)). 
62 See supra note 47; Leon, 468 U.S. at 928; Havens, 446 U.S. at 629; DeFillippo, 442 
U.S. at 41; Janis, 428 U.S. at 463-64; Peltier, 422 U.S. at 560. 
12
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cietal costs, and prosecutorial hurdles,63 the Supreme Court observed 
exceptions by which tainted evidence could evade per se exclusion.64  
In Nardone v. United States,65 the Court sought to resolve tensions at 
the interface of the exclusionary rule and ―realm of privacy left free 
by [the] Constitution.‖66  Thus, the Court invoked the attenuation 
principle to permit the admission of unlawfully procured evidence 
where its casual connection to the initial illegality was ―so attenuated 
as to dissipate the taint.‖67  Although in practice, ―the facts improper-
ly obtained do not ‗become sacred and inaccessible,‘ ‖68 the Court put 
a ―curb on their full indirect use.‖69  Recognizing that ―a Congres-
sional prohibition against the availability of certain evidence       
would . . . subordinate the need for rigorous administration of jus-
tice,‖ the Court vested confidence in the obedience of law enforce-
ment, the ability of litigants to meet their burdens, and the discretion 
of ―experienced trial judges.‖70 
 
63 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 150 (2009) (―[T]he exclusionary rule 
is not a defendant‘s right; rather it is simply a remedy applicable only when suppression 
would result in appreciable deterrence that outweighs the cost to the justice system.‖).  For 
further analyses, exploring the variant justifications for invoking and avoiding the exclusio-
nary rule see Robert M. Bloom and David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The 
Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
47 (2010).  In a brief synopsis, the authors contend that: 
[T]he rise and fall of judicial integrity as the principal justification for 
the use of the exclusionary rule mirrored the rise and fall of the Court‘s 
interest in applying the rule as a remedy to Fourth Amendment viola-
tions.  As the rationale of deterrence rose, judicial integrity was down-
played and then completely subsumed . . . Not only did deterrence be-
come the only benefit on one side of the ledger, but . . . the remedy was 
perceived to have only ―marginal‖ or ―incremental‖ deterrent value.  In 
contrast, the exclusion of ―highly probative evidence‖ was deemed a 
―substantial social cost‖ of applying the remedy.  As a result, [there was] 
a significant curtailment of the exclusionary rule and ultimately a down-
grading of the Fourth Amendment right itself. 
Id. at 58-59. 
64 See infra notes 67, 83, and 92. 
65 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
66 Id. at 339-40 (granting writ of certiorari upon realizing that the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule had created ―a far-reaching problem in the administration of criminal jus-
tice‖). 
67 Id. at 341 (recognizing that the attenuation principle, as an exception to the exclusio-
nary rule was ―[a] sensible way of dealing with such a situation–fair to the intendment of [of 
a statute], but fair also to the purposes of the criminal law‖). 
68 Id. (quoting Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392). 
69 Id. at 340 (citing Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392). 
70 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341-42 (―[T]imely steps must be taken to secure judicial determi-
13
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However, in Wong Sun v. United States,71 the scope of the ex-
clusionary rule was enlarged to also preclude evidence deemed an 
―indirect product or ‗fruit‘ of unlawful police conduct.‖72  The Court 
established that law enforcement could not validate a search and sei-
zure that was ―unlawful at its inception,‖ using the very evidence dis-
closed by the course of illegal conduct.73  It is noteworthy however, 
that the Court narrowed its holding by recognizing that: 
[Not] all evidence is ―fruit of the poisonous tree‖ 
simply because it would not have come to light but for 
the illegal actions of the police.  Rather, the more apt 
question in such a case is ―whether, granting estab-
lishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means suf-
ficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint.‖74 
In Murray v. United States,75 another exception saved materi-
al evidence from suppression.76  Federal agents suspected defendant 
of ―conspiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs.‖77  After the 
agents observed the transportation of suspicious containers, the driv-
ers were arrested and their vehicles, which contained marijuana, were 
 
nation of claims of illegality on the part of agents of the Government obtaining testimony.  
To interrupt the course of the trial for [] auxiliary inquiries impedes the [trial] momentum . . . 
and breaks the continuity of the jury‘s attention.‖). 
71 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
72 Nix, 467 U.S. at 441 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88).  In Wong Sun, the Court 
concluded that even the ―evidence at the third or fourth remove was equally inadmissible 
with the matter originally obtained‖ as a result of unlawful police conduct.  JAMES GEORGE, 
JR., CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 46 (The Institute of 
Continuing Legal Education 1966) (noting that the Court held that both defendant‘s state-
ments and evidence obtained after the initial illegality were derivatives from the seizure, but 
nevertheless, inadmissible because neither was severable from the primary taint). 
73 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (citing Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)).  The 
Court in Byars refused to uphold the use of ―equivocal methods, which regarded superficial-
ly, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality but which, in reality, strike at the substance 
of the constitutional right.‖  Byars, 273 U.S. at 33-34. 
74 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF 
GUILT 221 (1959)). 
75 487 U.S. 533 (1987). 
76 See infra note 83. 
77 Murray, 487 U.S. at 535. 
14
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lawfully seized.78  Next, the agents forcibly entered the premises, dis-
covering ―without disturbing‖ bales of marijuana.79  Knowing that the 
warehouse held such contraband, the agents subsequently applied for 
a warrant.80  However, they neither mentioned, nor shared their ob-
servations from the prior entry.81  Thus, defense counsel argued that 
―the warrant was tainted‖ because of the earlier warrantless search.82 
Invoking the independent source doctrine, the Court found 
that the ―lawful seizure [was] genuinely independent of an earlier 
tainted one.‖83  The Court discarded the ―position that the ‗indepen-
dent source‘ doctrine does apply to independent acquisition of evi-
dence previously derived indirectly from the unlawful search, but 
does not apply to what [the defense] call[s] ‗primary evidence,‘ ‖84 
explaining that ―this strange distinction would produce results bear-
ing no relation to the policies of the exclusionary rule.‖85  Moreover, 
the Court in Murray reasoned that: 
This is as clear a case as can be imagined where the 
discovery of the contraband in plain view was totally 
irrelevant to the later securing of a warrant and the 
successful search that ensued.  As there was no causal 
link whatever between the illegal entry and the dis-
covery of the challenged evidence, we find no error in 
the court‘s refusal to suppress.86 
To say that the Supreme Court has navigated creative detours 
around the exclusionary rule would be an understatement because the 
most innovative of its exceptions is to follow. 
 
 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 535-36. 
81 Id. 
82 Murray, 487 U.S. at 536. 
83 Id. at 542 (invoking the independent source doctrine to rehabilitate and admit the un-
lawfully procured evidence). 
84 Id. at 540-41. 
85 Id. at 541 (―Invoking the exclusionary rule [in this context] would put the police (and 
society) not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation occurred, but in a 
worse one.‖) (emphasis omitted). 
86 Id. at 543 (quoting United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 604 (1st Cir. 1985)), va-
cated by Rooney v. United States, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986). 
15
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III.  THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY RULE–FINDING A FACTUAL 
PREDICATE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN “WOULD HAVE” 
VERSUS “COULD HAVE” ALLEGATIONS 
Although each exception to the exclusionary rule carries a 
unique burden and benefit, the inevitable discovery rule appears most 
problematic in its administration.  Indeed, the attenuation principle 
raises ―the question of causal connection,‖ but nevertheless, this is an 
issue ―with which the law concerns itself.‖87  Furthermore, applica-
tion of the attenuation principle does not rest exclusively on causa-
tion, but rather, the test ―necessarily includes other elements.‖88  
Likewise, the independent source doctrine is to an extent circum-
scribed by a reliable and factual predicate–the tainted evidence must 
be ultimately found ―through a source independent of the illegali-
ty.‖89 
In contrast, the interesting paradox behind the inevitable dis-
covery rule derives from the vague Supreme Court precedent estab-
lished in Nix v. Williams.90  As Justice Stevens observed, concurring 
in the opinion, the ―[g]eneralizations about the exclusionary rule em-
ployed by the majority . . . simply [did] not address the primary ques-
tion in the case.‖91  The Court hastily concluded that evidence illegal-
ly procured, but destined to a lawful, inevitable discovery does not 
warrant suppression, but failed to affirmatively define the contours of 
the prophylactic rule.92 
Surprisingly, an isolated footnote is perhaps the most infor-
mative portion of the decision.  The Court remarked that ―inevitable 
discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demon-
strated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment 
and does not require a departure from the unusual burden of proof at 
 
87 United States v. Ceccollini, 435 U.S. 268, 274 (1978). 
88 Id. 
89 The Exclusionary Rule, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 192, 204 (2008) (―The in-
dependent source doctrine reflects the idea that, although the government should not profit 
from its own misconduct, it also should not be made worse off than it would have been had 
the misconduct not occurred.‖). 
90 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
91 Id. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
92 Id. at 444 (majority opinion) (observing that the inevitable discovery rule repairs the 
evidence tainted by unlawful procurement where the prosecution demonstrates that a se-
quence of predictable, but hypothetical, facts would have caused an inevitable discovery of 
the same evidence). 
16
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suppression hearings.‖93  Thus, there is at least some indication that 
the United States Supreme Court did not intend for the inevitable dis-
covery rule to stampede the exclusionary rule, creating an ―anything 
goes‖ playing field for the police.  Despite inferring that the prosecu-
tion must provide a constellation of facts that would have led to an 
inevitable discovery, many of these cases, at the state and federal le-
vels, manifest reliance on what the police could have, but deliberately 
chose not to do. 
There is no denying the repugnant facts before the Court in 
Nix, as a child was murdered, her body discarded, and then exposed 
to ―freezing temperatures‖ and ―tissue deterioration.‖94  Nevertheless, 
because defendant invoked the right to counsel upon arrest, the Court 
considered the unlawfulness of the custodial interrogation done in the 
absence of defendant‘s attorney.95  It was undisputed that a detective 
coerced defendant into disclosing incriminating details related to the 
murder.96  Yet, stressing that a search party was in the vicinity where 
the body was found, the prosecutor showed ―a preponderance of the 
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have 
been discovered by lawful means–here the volunteers‘ search.‖97 
Despite the police misstep, the Court in Nix admitted ―evi-
dence of the body‘s location and condition.‖98  The Court stated that 
―the deterrence rationale‖ for exclusion was not served in this con-
 
93 Id. at 444 n.5. 
94 Id. at 438. 
95 Nix, 467 U.S. at 435-36. 
96 Id.  While transporting defendant from the local police station to the city in which ar-
rangements were made to meet with his attorney, a detective provoked defendant to inadver-
tently incriminate himself by informing him that they were passing the location where the 
victim‘s body was allegedly discarded.  Id. at 436.  The detective stated: 
I want to give you something to think about while we‘re traveling down 
the road . . . They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I 
feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little 
girl‘s body is . . . and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be 
unable to find it.  And since we will be going right past the area [where 
the body is] on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and 
locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a 
Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on 
Christmas [E]ve and murdered . . . [A]fter a snow storm [we may not be] 
able to find it at all. 
Id. at 435-36. 
97 Id. at 444. 
98 Nix, 467 U.S. at 441. 
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text, haphazardly explaining that law enforcement officers presented 
―with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, 
be in a position to calculate whether the evidence sought would in-
evitably be discovered.‖99  Moreover, noting that suppression would 
facilitate the release of a dangerous offender and put the general pub-
lic at risk, the Court refused to allow the misjudgment of a police of-
ficer to relieve defendant of the conviction.100 
While the inevitable discovery rule was justified as necessary 
to serve justice and protect society, the Supreme Court left several 
important questions unresolved, including: (i) what does ―inevitable‖ 
mean; (ii) how to satisfy the preponderance standard using hypotheti-
cal facts; and (iii) whether the doctrine can remove the taint of any 
and all categories of evidence.  That is, the predominant dispute in 
this area turns on whether the Court meant to restrict the scope of the 
inevitable discovery rule to derivative or secondary evidence, or al-
ternatively, to permit its use to admit primary evidence. 
 
IV.  THE POST-NIX CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Court in Nix did not articulate the scope of the inevitable 
discovery rule, but rather, left the circuits (and the states) to interpret 
 
99 Id. at 444-45 (finding that suppression would not deter police from misconduct); but see 
id. at 441 (observing that defendant urged the court to make the inevitable discovery rule 
contingent upon ―a threshold showing of police good faith‖).  However, rejecting this pro-
posal, the Court refused ―to impose added burdens on the already difficult task of proving 
guilt in criminal cases by enlarging the barrier to placing evidence of unquestioned truth be-
fore juries.‖  Id. at 444 n.5.  While the Court in Nix did not impose a good faith requirement 
in this specific context, it has been duly recognized as an independent exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.  See Leon, 468 U.S. at 924 (concluding that the Court should consider and ―the 
prosecution should ordinarily be able to establish objective good faith without a substantial 
expenditure of judicial time‖).  But see id. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for condoning entry into ―a curious world where the costs of excluding illegally ob-
tained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the benefits of such exclusion are 
made to disappear with a mere wave of the hand‖) (emphasis omitted).  Compare People v. 
Goldstone, 682 N.W.2d 479, 490 (Mich. 2004) (―Although the warrant was later determined 
to be deficient, excluding the evidence recovered in good-faith reliance on the warrant would 
not further the purpose of the exclusionary rule, i.e., to deter police misconduct.‖), with Dor-
sey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 820 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2000) (―[T]here can be no good faith excep-
tion when the probable cause requirement in the Delaware Constitution is absent–as in this 
case.‖). 
99 See infra note 174. 
100 Nix, 467 U.S. at 447. 
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its precedent.  There remains a split among the federal circuits, as 
these courts have adopted divergent approaches to apply and reject 
the application of the inevitable discovery rule.  Some circuit courts 
expansively read Nix to preserve primary and derivative or secondary 
evidence, which was unlawfully procured, but destined for an inevit-
able discovery.101  Meanwhile, other courts bar its use where the evi-
dence is found as an immediate consequence of an unlawful search 
and seizure.102  These courts have narrowly read Nix to limit the in-
 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the 
Seventh Circuit allowed for the admission of primary evidence on the ground that discovery 
would have inevitably occurred in an inventory search, but entertained no further discussion 
of the distinction between primary and derivative evidence); United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 
1102, 1108 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that ―[t]his circuit and several other circuits recognize 
that evidence which was originally obtained improperly should not be suppressed, provided 
that it would have been legitimately uncovered pursuant to normal police practices‖).  Upon 
concluding that ―the rifle and crack cocaine would have been inevitably discovered during 
the normal inventory procedures‖ of the precinct, the court in Seals applied the inevitable 
discovery rule to primary evidence.  Id. (noting however, that the court failed to provide any 
comprehensive analysis distinguishing primary from derivative evidence); accord United 
States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 979 n.7 (1st Cir. 1994) (observing that the court ―decline[d] to 
embrace the suggestion that courts should confine the inevitable discovery rule to cases in 
which the disputed evidence comprises a derivative, rather than primary, fruit of unlawful 
police conduct‖); United States v. Whitehorn, 813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding 
that ―unless and until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, the inevitable discovery rule may 
be applied even though the evidence validly obtained under a search warrant was previously 
uncovered in an illegal search‖); United States v. Pimentel, 810 F.2d 366, 369 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(noting that where ―there was an ongoing audit which surely would have uncovered the let-
ters,‖ the inevitable discovery rule was invoked to admit the primary evidence and defeat the 
challenge premised upon their unlawful procurement); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 
736, 746 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding the ―later drafted [] affidavits for the warrants‖ sufficient 
evidence that ―a search warrant for the garage would have inevitably been sought and issued 
even if the illegal search had never taken place‖); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 
1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (reasoning that because ―the search of the briefcase and shoulder bag 
were incident to [defendant‘s] arrest [] even if the search was tainted, the evidence is admiss-
ible under the inevitable discovery exception‖); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 
(10th Cir. 1982) (observing that where the arrest ―followed quickly on the heels of the chal-
lenged search,‖ the marijuana that police seized prior to the arrest was admissible despite its 
classification as primary evidence) (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 
(1980)).  In Romero, the court explained the importance of timing and the immediacy of 
events transpiring to lead up the lawful arrest.  Id. at 703-04 (finding the police action ―justi-
fiable as a search incident to a lawful arrest‖ because of the officer‘s pertinent observations 
at this particular scene and general law enforcement experience). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing 
that ―at the time the Government violated [defendant‘s] fourth amendment right, it did not 
possess the legal means that would have led to the discovery of the shotgun,‖ nor could it use 
the inevitable discovery rule to rehabilitate the direct products of an illegal search and sei-
zure). 
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evitable discovery rule‘s application to derivative evidence.103  Con-
sidering an overarching justification for this view, it has been said 
that allowing the police to conduct a premature warrantless search, 
but ―later initiate a lawful avenue of obtaining the evidence and then 
claim that it should be admitted because its discovery is inevitable‖ 
offends basic notions of justice.104  Thus, the courts that accept this 
position require that challenged evidence be an indirect product of the 
unlawful search to justify admission by its inevitable discovery.105 
In addition to differentiating between primary and derivative 
evidence, several circuits further qualified the inevitable discovery 
rule.  First, there exists an active pursuit requirement, which courts 
have recognized in variant degrees.106  Second, several courts have 
found the search incident to arrest107 and/or the inventory search,108 as 
 
103 Id. at 847.  But see Ara K. Ayvazian, Note, People v. Saldana, 27 TOURO L. REV. 631, 
648 (2011) (observing that the inevitable discovery rule is interpreted and applied unpredict-
ably between and within various jurisdictions, and thus, ―[t]he distinction between primary 
and secondary evidence is questionable . . . and needs to be cleared up by the high court.‖). 
104 Id. at 846.  The Court in Satterfield explained: 
Because a valid search warrant nearly always can be obtained after the 
search has occurred, a contrary holding would practically destroy the re-
quirement that a warrant for the search of a home be obtained before the 
search takes place.  Our constitutionally-mandated preference for substi-
tuting the judgment of a detached and neutral magistrate for that of a 
searching officer, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 568 
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), would be greatly undermined. 
Id.; Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d at 64 (―[W]e will not risk the whittling down of the warrant 
requirement, without regard for compelling circumstances vel non, by justifying the admis-
sion of evidence under a broad inevitable-discovery exception.‖); United States v. Griffin, 
502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir.) (prohibiting police from ―enter[ing] a home without a warrant 
merely because they plan subsequently to get one,‖ as such a rule ―would tend in actual prac-
tice to emasculate . . . the Fourth Amendment.‖). 
105 See, e.g., United States v. $639, 558 in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 720 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (limiting application to derivative evidence upon observation that ―[t]he 
reasoning of Nix in support of the inevitable discovery exception relied heavily on the deriv-
ative nature of evidence, and the Court‘s statement about not putting the government in a 
worse position because of police misconduct was limited to that subject‖). 
106 United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 1995) (―Whether an independent 
line of investigation is required for the inevitable discovery exception to apply is a question 
that has divided the circuits.‖).  However, the circuit courts that have imposed an active pur-
suit requirement have done so in varying degrees.  Compare United States v. Owens, 782 
F.2d 146, 152-53 (10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the inevitable discovery rule‘s application ab-
sent an ongoing, independent investigation at the time of the unlawful search), with Cherry, 
759 F.2d at 1205 (observing the active pursuit requirement, but adopting a less stringent ap-
proach). 
107 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (observing that because ―the arrest on 
the weapons charge was supported by probable cause, [] the search of his person and of the 
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upheld by the Supreme Court, to satisfy the requisite criteria for in-
evitable discovery.109  Significantly, these rules are founded upon fac-
tual predicates.110  Therefore, where invocation of the inevitable dis-
covery rule is synchronized with one of the aforesaid principles, there 
 
car incident to that arrest was lawful‖); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949) 
(noting generally, that the search incident to arrest exception authorizes a limited search of 
the arrestee before incarceration); accord SIDNEY H. ASCH, POLICE AUTHORITY AND THE 
RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 71 (1968) (―A search is authorized without a warrant when a 
person has been legally arrested for a crime.  At that point, the police may search him to dis-
cover if he has a weapon, burglar tools, or stolen goods.  At times, the premises where he 
was arrested m[a]y be subjected to search.‖). 
108 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (giving deference to the standard inven-
tory procedures employed by law enforcement, as the search authorized ―serve[s] to protect 
an owner‘s property while it is in custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, sto-
len, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger‖); Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 
645 (explaining that ―[t]he governmental interests underlying a stationhouse search of the 
arrestee‘s person and possessions may in some circumstances be even greater than those 
supporting a search immediately following arrest‖); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 
804 (1974) (noting that upon arrival at the precinct, ―[w]ith or without probable cause, the 
authorities were entitled . . . not only to search [defendant‘s] clothing but also to take it from 
him and keep it in official custody‖).  The Court in Edwards further elicited that ―belongings 
may be seized upon arrival of the accused at the place of detention and later . . . admissible at 
trial.‖  Id. 
109 See, e.g., Zapata, 18 F.3d at 978 (observing that several ―courts often have held that 
evidence which would have turned up during an inventory search comes under the umbrella 
of the inevitable discovery rule‖); United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 
1986) (affirming the lower court‘s decision to admit evidence, although it was unlawfully 
procured, as ―it is normal DEA procedure to inventory defendant‘s possessions, including a 
garment bag, at the time of booking, the government has shown by preponderance of the 
evidence that cocaine would have been inevitably discovered‖); United States v. Seohnlein, 
423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1970) (observing that ―[a]lthough the knowledge gained from 
examining the wallet may have accelerated a lawful arrest on the Baltimore warrant, it did 
not taint the evidence that was subsequently obtained,‖ as defendant was lawfully arrested 
before the search of his possessions) (citing Leek v. Maryland, 353 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 
1965)).  But see U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d at 721 (concluding that neither the inventory search 
exception, nor the contemplation of a search incident to arrest, were sufficient grounds to 
show that discovery was inevitable under the circumstances).  For further analysis of the ra-
tionale for authorizing post-arrest warrantless searches, see MACHADO ZOTTI, supra note 29, 
at 166-67 (noting that ―the justices concluded it was reasonable for arresting officers to se-
cure any evidence suspects might have on their person and moreover, to ensure the safety of 
the police officer‖).  Ultimately, the task of defining the scope of these searches proved a 
difficult task, i.e., the police departments were obliged to adjust their policies and instruct 
officials accordingly, as [r]etraining sessions had to be held from the very top administrators 
down to each of the thousands of foot patrolmen and detectives engaged in the daily en-
forcement function.‖  Id. at 167 (citing Michael Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods 
in Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 
939, 941 (1966)). 
110 See Edwards, 415 U.S. at 804 (noting that the accused was in fact placed under arrest 
to show inevitability). 
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is less risk of an ambitious prosecutor arbitrarily eschewing the facts 
and narrating a hypothetical to show that the discovery was forthcom-
ing.111 
A.  The Active Pursuit Requirement–A Veiled 
Dissolution Of The Primary v. Derivative Evidence 
Distinction 
The active pursuit requirement mandates the preexistence of 
an alternative investigation before the police misconduct occurs in 
order to invoke the inevitable discovery rule.112  The Fifth Circuit im-
posed this prerequisite in United States v. Cherry.113  Upon reviewing 
circuit decisions preceding Nix, the court in Cherry concluded that its 
earlier precedent remained good law.114  The court established that 
unless a lawful investigation was active and ongoing, admission of 
tainted evidence undermined Fourth Amendment protection.115  Al-
though ―suppression in such a case may put the prosecution in a 
worse position because of the police misconduct,‖ the court conceded 
that ―a contrary result would cause the inevitable discovery exception 
to swallow the [exclusionary] rule.‖116  Accordingly, the court recon-
sidered and interpreted three companion factors, which the prosecu-
tion must prove to prevail under the inevitable discovery rule.117 
The court decided that: (i) ―a reasonable probability [must ex-
ist] that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means 
but for the police misconduct;‖ (ii) police must possess sufficient 
leads, as a basis for contending inevitable discovery; and (iii) police 
 
111 See U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d at 720 (observing the court‘s well-founded fear that ap-
plication of the inevitable discovery rule to save primary evidence from suppression would 
invite eager police officers to conduct warrantless searches at their leisure by subsequently 
relying on standard inventory practice). 
112 United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (1985) (citing United States v. Brookins, 
614 F.2d 1037, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980)).  Although the Court in Nix did not expressly impose 
an active pursuit requirement, the facts underlying its invocation of the inevitable discovery 
rule illicit evidence that lawful search was ongoing at the time the illegal seizure occurred.  
See Nix, 467 U.S. at 435 (noting that ―the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation initiated a 
large-scale search‖ with the assistance of volunteers in an effort to locate the body that was 
ultimately, and allegedly unlawfully, procured by the police). 
113 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985). 
114 Id. at 1204. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1205. 
117 Id. at 1204. 
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must have been ―actively pursuing the alternate line of investigation‖ 
when the unlawful search occurred.118  Observing a slight change 
from the initial Fifth Circuit prerequisites, the court in Cherry did not 
mandate that the police maintain specific leads at the time of the sei-
zure, but rather, compensated for the circumstances in which ―an in-
tervening and independent event occurring subsequent to the miscon-
duct‖ might nevertheless render the evidentiary discovery 
inevitable.119 
Despite disavowing the requirement that the police maintain 
the requisite leads when the constitutional violation occurs, the court 
did differentiate between primary and derivative evidence.120  Thus, 
while affirming the admissibility of fingerprint evidence that was in-
directly gained via the unlawful arrest, the court in Cherry held that 
the pistol and related contraband required suppression, as each was 
primary evidence and irreparably tainted.121 
Likewise, in United States v. Silvestri,122 observing that the 
exclusionary rule is provoked by ―many different fact patterns,‖ the 
First Circuit stated that a ―bright-line rule goes too far.‖123  As the 
court found that the unlawful discovery of drugs neither influenced, 
nor accelerated the ―decision to seek a search warrant,‖ it upheld the 
use of the inevitable discovery rule to admit primary evidence absent 
an ongoing investigation.124  Thus, without addressing the outer 
bounds of the inevitable discovery rule and despite the prejudice suf-
 
118 Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1204 (citing Brookins, 614 F.2d at 1048). 
119 Id. at 1205 (adopting a flexible approach to the active pursuit requirement) (citing 
United States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1982)); see United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 
984, 985 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Tenth Circuit rejected that ―proof of a separate in-
vestigation ongoing at the time of the constitutional violation‖ is required to invoke the in-
evitable discovery rule).  For consideration of the divergent outcomes in this context due to 
the weight given to different factors, compare Brookins, 614 F.2d at 1043 (observing ―the 
voluntariness of the witness‘ testimony,‖ id. n.4, in tandem with the leads known by police at 
the time of the illegal search in assessing the inevitability of discovery), with Pinckney, 2011 
WL 4011362, at *2 (noting that defendant did not object when the officer requested he re-
move his hands from his pockets and the officer‘s initial encounter with defendant was 
prompted by eyewitness statements that defendant caused the motor vehicle accident). 
120 Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1212. 
121 Id. 
122 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986). 
123 Id. at 745-46 (discarding the active pursuit requirement and determining that ―a search 
warrant for the garage would have inevitably been sought and issued even if the illegal 
search had never taken place.‖). 
124 Id. at 745. 
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fered by defendant,125 the court in Silvestri allowed a warrant subse-
quently secured to rehabilitate the tainted evidence.126 
Hence, the First Circuit discards the material distinction be-
tween primary and derivative evidence in the application of the in-
evitable discovery rule.127  The court ruled in United States v. Zapa-
ta128 that ―both the fruits of the search and the ensuing confession‖ 
were admissible129 on the ground that ―suppression would not lie in 
this instance for the contraband inevitably would have been discov-
ered.‖130  Unsurprisingly, the court‘s theory was full of ambiguity, 
stating that: 
Evidence which comes to light by unlawful means 
nonetheless can be used at trial if it ineluctably would 
have been revealed in some other (lawful) way,131 so 
long as (i) the lawful means of its discovery are inde-
pendent and would necessarily have been employed, 
(ii) discovery by that means is in fact inevitable, and 
(iii) application of the doctrine in a particular case will 
 
125 Id. at 738 (noting that on appeal, defendant urged the court to interpret inevitability, as 
contingent upon ―the legal means for finding the illegally discovered evidence be in process 
at the time of discovery‖); see also United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 379 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(stating that if tainted evidence is inextricably involved in the procurement of a search war-
rant, a court should ―set aside the tainted information and then determine if ‗there remains 
sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause‘ ‖) (quoting 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172 (1978)).  
126 Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 745 (adopting a flexible standard that required a threshold inquiry 
into the circumstances preceding the search and the events which transpired thereafter). 
127 See infra note 128 (noting that in Zapata, the court unequivocally applied the inevita-
ble discovery rule to the original evidence retrieved as a direct product of the alleged unlaw-
ful search and that which was later revealed). 
128 18 F.3d 971, 978 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying the inevitable discovery rule to both prima-
ry and derivative evidence). 
129 Id. at 975. 
130 Id. at 978 (noting that a vast majority of federal circuit courts ―have held that evidence 
which would have turned up during an inventory search comes under the umbrella of the in-
evitable discovery rule‖); see, e.g., United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 732 (10th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that 
that inventory searches conducted in compliance with standardized law enforcement proce-
dures create permissible grounds for the government to search and seize contraband absent 
the establishment of probable cause, acknowledging both written procedures, as well as oral 
procedures to suffice in a judicial determination). 
131 Zapata, 18 F.3d at 978 (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 448) (reiterating the central rationale 
articulated in Nix that where ―the evidence in question would have been discovered without 
reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and 
the evidence is admissible‖). 
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not sully the prophylaxis of the Fourth Amendment.132 
Thus, possibly due to practical difficulties or the potential for 
abuse, as broadly illustrated above, several circuit courts have either 
qualified the active pursuit rule or discarded it entirely. 
B.  Active Pursuit Found Insufficient–Alternative 
Grounds For Inevitability 
The predominant concern with the inevitable discovery rule is 
its use to revive primary evidence directly retrieved by the unlawful 
search.133  Although the active pursuit requirement does not resolve 
the immediate fear that law enforcement will abuse this exception 
and avoid the exclusionary rule, it at least mandates a preexisting in-
vestigation of the accused in an attempt to comply with the precedent 
set by Nix.134 
However, expressly rejected by several of the circuits, these 
courts use threshold tests, requiring circumstantial assessments of in-
evitability.135  The following discussion explores a seemingly heigh-
tened standard governing inevitability, mandating substantiated facts 
beyond the mere claim of an active investigation.  The vast majority 
of decisional law explored exemplifies the reliance on an inventory 
search or a search incident to arrest to establish the foundational facts 
to invoke the inevitable discovery rule. 
The Second Circuit does not use the active pursuit require-
 
132 Zapata, 18 F.3d at 978. 
133 See supra note 112 (fearing that substantive rights under the Fourth Amendment and 
the companion procedural protections guaranteed to a criminal defendant would be cleverly 
undermined by police that execute a warrantless search and subsequently claim inevitability 
as a scapegoat to prevent exclusion of primary evidence); see also Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 
(noting the ―long-prevailing standards [in place that] seek to safeguard citizens from rash 
and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crimes,‖ as 
deemed necessary to protect ―law-abiding citizens [from] the mercy of the officers‘ whim or 
caprice‖). 
134 Nix, 467 U.S. at 455 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―[I]nevitable discovery involves no 
speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verifica-
tion or impeachment.‖). 
135 See United States v. Perea, 986 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. George, 
971 F.2d 1113, 1121-22 (4th Cir. 1992); Seals, 987 F.2d at 1107-08; United States v. Ken-
nedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1995); Andrade, 784 F.2d at 1433 (recognizing that 
these circuit courts applied the inevitable discovery rule to prevent the suppression of unlaw-
fully procured evidence on the ground that it was forthcoming pursuant to either an invento-
ry search or an alternative standardized procedure). 
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ment, but supports the basic policy to ―prevent the inevitable discov-
ery exception from swallowing the exclusionary rule.‖136  In United 
States v. Eng,137 the Second Circuit identified factors intended to re-
duce the general uncertainty underlying the inevitable discovery rule.  
The court proposed that: 
[P]roof of inevitability is made more convincing when 
the areas of the search or investigation are well-
defined, the government effort is planned and method-
ical, and a direct causal relationship and reasonably 
close temporal relationship exist between what was 
known and what had occurred prior to the government 
misconduct and the allegedly inevitable discovery of 
the evidence.138 
In Eng, the government was investigating defendant on tax 
evasion suspicions when it conducted a warrantless search, seizing 
incriminating evidence from a personal safe.139  Emphasizing the un-
due delay before the government finally procured a subpoena for de-
fendant‘s financial records,140 the court concluded that ―[t]he mere 
fact the government serves a subpoena‖ does not by design make it 
inevitable ―that it will obtain the documents it requests.‖141  In turn, it 
reasoned that an active investigation on its own is insufficient to 
prove inevitable discovery and alleviate the constitutional implica-
tions of an unreasonable search and seizure.142 
In United States v. Cabassa,143 the Second Circuit similarly 
endeavored to prevent the government from using the inevitable dis-
covery rule to cover up its hypothetical leapfrog.144  In sum, the court 
 
136 United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992). 
137 Id. at 859. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 857. 
140 Id. 
141 Eng, 971 F.2d at 860 (―Moreover, we can deplore but not ignore the possibility that the 
recipient of a subpoena may falsely claim to have lost or destroyed the documents called for, 
or may even deliberately conceal or destroy them after service of the subpoena.‖ (quoting 
United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
142 Id.  (―While we decline to draw a bright line, it is essential that there be a substantial 
degree of directness in the government‘s chain of discovery argument, rather than a hypothe-
sized ‗leapfrogging‘ from one subpoena recipient to the next until the piece of evidence is 
reached.‖). 
143 62 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 1995).  
144 Eng, 971 F.2d at 860. 
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held that ―the doctrine of inevitable discovery requires something 
more where the discovery is based upon the expected issuance of a 
warrant.‖145  The dispute arose after police acted prematurely, follow-
ing the lead of a cooperating informant with regard to locations 
where defendant ―allegedly ran his drug business‖ and ―stored and 
processed the narcotics.‖146 
At the outset, federal agents arranged ―to maintain surveil-
lance at the target location until the search warrant was obtained and 
then conduct the search.‖147  Instead, acting on instinct and without 
receiving ―news about the status of the search warrant,‖ the team 
forcibly entered the premises, handcuffed defendant, and unlawfully 
seized drugs, weaponry, and contraband from the apartment.148  On 
review, the court sought to determine ―what would have happened 
had the unlawful search never occurred.‖149  To minimize the specul-
ative nature of its inquiry, the court narrowly focused on the ―affairs 
as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search.‖150 
Because the police deviated from their initial plan,151 the court 
examined what prompted the illegal search.152  The record revealed 
that the DEA agent anticipated ―event[s] that might well have led to 
 
145 Cabassa, 62 F.3d at 474.  The court took several factors into consideration, explaining 
that: 
First, the extent of completion relates directly to the question of whether 
a warrant would in fact have issued; ultimate discovery would obviously 
be more likely if a warrant is actually obtained.  Second, it informs the 
determination of whether the same evidence would have been discovered 
pursuant to the warrant.  If the process of obtaining a search warrant has 
barely begun, for example, the inevitability of discovery is lessened by 
the probability, under all the circumstances of the case, that the evidence 
in question would no longer have been at the location of the illegal 
search when the warrant actually issued. 
Id. at 473. 
146 Id. at 471. 
147 Id. at 472 (anticipating receipt of the warrant to seize the premises). 
148 Id. (highlighting the instantaneous decision to act without legal authority, as initially 
intended). 
149 Cabassa, 62 F.3d at 473 (citing Eng, 997 F.2d at 990). 
150 Id. 
151 See supra notes 147 and 148. 
152 Cabassa, 62 F.3d at 474 (noting that ―[a]lthough the warrant process had commenced, 
the application was not completed at the time of the search‖).  Compare id. at 473 (refusing 
to apply the inevitable discovery rule where a warrant was never issued), with United States 
v. Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225, 1232 (2d Cir. 1987) (observing that the warrant application 
was granted merely six hours after the unlawful search, enhancing the likelihood that a law-
ful discovery was inevitable). 
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the disappearance of the evidence.‖153  In turn, the court in Cabassa 
clarified that in this instance, the perceived risk of losing evidence 
neither justified the warrantless search, nor proved inevitable discov-
ery.154  To the contrary, the contemplation of losing what might be-
come unattainable evidence reduced the odds of inevitable discov-
ery.155  Thus, stressing the necessary distinction ―between proving by 
a preponderance that something would have happened‖ from ―some-
thing would inevitably have happened,‖ the court construed the 
agent‘s fear that failing to act would obstruct the investigation, as in-
dicative of the government‘s negligible warrant expectations.156 
C.  The Inevitability Of A Standard Protocol 
Inventory Search Or A Search Conducted Incident 
To Lawful Arrest 
In United States v. Mendez,157 the Second Circuit allowed 
admission of evidence under ―the inevitable discovery exception on 
the basis of an inventory search.‖158  The court recognized that expli-
cit standard procedures that would have authorized the search and the 
seizure alleviated the need to accept a presumptive set of facts and 
held that discovery was inevitable.159  Thus, the circumstances of this 
case are distinguishable from the preceding Second Circuit opi-
nions.160  That is, the ―inevitable inventory search‖ undergone in the 
present case withstood reliance on the usual question: but for the ille-
gality, would lawful action have procured the same discovery? 
In Mendez, the officer obtained an auto-theft warrant, which 
provided sufficient legal cause to first approach defendant.161  How-
 
153 Cabassa, 62 F.3d at 474 (noting that the agent‘s testimony, expressing that he feared 
defendant would flee if he suspected police presence, ―undercut[] the argument that the same 
evidence would inevitably have been found by a later search pursuant to a warrant.‖). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 315 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002). 
158 Id. at 138. 
159 Id. at 139. 
160 See supra Eng, note 141, at 860 and Cabassa, note 145, at 473 (noting that these deci-
sions reflected variable factors, but did not involve facts ascertainable by written precinct 
rules or undisputed customary precinct practice). 
161 Mendez, 315 F.3d at 134 (observing that the officer had an auto-theft warrant and al-
though the search revealed he was the rightful owner, he was arrested after discovery that he 
was not properly licensed or registered). 
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ever, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized post-arrest in 
a vehicle search.162  Specifically, the defense challenged the admis-
sion of a loaded gun and heroin that the officers found in an unlocked 
glove compartment while taking inventory of the vehicle.163  Review-
ing the case de novo, the court determined that the government had 
proven inevitable discovery.164  Three factors were pertinent to the 
finding of inevitability to include: (i) legitimate police custody of the 
property;165 (ii) an inventory search executed in accord with ―estab-
lished or standardized procedures;‖166 and (iii) set procedures that 
―would have inevitably led to the discovery of the challenged evi-
dence.‖167  Thus, the court said that ―notwithstanding the fact that the 
policy was not in writing,‖ the lawful arrest laid a proper foundation 
to establish that ―the evidence would inevitably have been discovered 
in a valid inventory search.‖168 
 
V.  THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IN NEW YORK 
STATE: RAISING THE BAR 
Just as the circuit courts independently interpreted and 
adopted various highlights of the Supreme Court‘s establishment of 
the inevitable discovery rule, the states alike have followed in this 
trend.  Most significantly, New York State courts restrict the applica-
tion of the inevitable discovery rule to secondary or derivative evi-
 
162 Id. at 135. 
163 Id. at 134-35. 
164 Id. at 139. 
165 Id. at 138; Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 644 (noting that an ―inventory search is not an inde-
pendent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and pre-
ceding incarceration‖).  As the Court explained in Lafayette, the ―proper perspective‖ of the 
reasonableness and lawfulness of an inventory search requires courts to scrutinize ―the evo-
lution of interests [an individual‘s right to privacy competing with the duty of a police offic-
er to serve and protect] along the continuum from arrest to incarceration.‖  Id.; United States 
v. Jenkins, 876 F.2d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir. 1989) (―[B]efore an inventory search is permissible, 
the government must have legitimate custody of the property to be inventoried, either as a 
result of lawful arrest [ . . . ] or by some other method.‖).  
166 Mendez, 315 F.3d at 138 (internal quotations omitted). 
167 Id. (internal quotations omitted); see United States v. Griffiths, 47 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 
1995) (observing that the government must present evidence of inevitable discovery ―pur-
suant to an established inventory policy, written or otherwise, including a specific procedure 
[of] dealing‖ with the property in question). 
168 Mendez, 315 F.3d at 138-39. 
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dence.169  At the outset, it is worth reiterating that while this limita-
tion is not destructive to the inevitable discovery rule, the court in 
Pinckney failed to differentiate between the primary and derivative 
evidence challenged in the case.  Thus, the concern is that until the 
Supreme Court delineates the proper scope of the inevitable discov-
ery rule, lower courts are bound erratically apply, or fail to apply, this 
exception. 
The New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Fitzpa-
trick170 in the pre-Nix era, and thus, reliance on the decision might in-
cite criticism.  Nevertheless, its precedential impact on the inevitable 
discovery rule in New York State is renowned, differentiating be-
tween primary and derivative evidence.171  In Fitzpatrick, the state 
police stopped defendant to inquire about a gas station hold up when 
he ―produced a pistol and shot both officers.‖172  Responding to a 
lead, but ―acting without a warrant,‖173 the police entered a private 
home, found defendant in a closet, and pursued questioning about 
―the gun he had used.‖174 
Although voluntarily directing the officers back to the closet 
where the gun was stashed, defendant argued for its exclusion, alleg-
ing that the search was made without legal authority and evidence 
seized was fruit of the poisonous tree.175  In turn, the court in Fitzpa-
trick observed that: 
[E]vidence obtained as a result of information derived 
from an unlawful search or other illegal police conduct 
is not inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous 
 
169 People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 913-14 (N.Y. 1987) (―[O]ur court has never applied 
the rule where, as here, the evidence sought to be suppressed is the very evidence obtained in 
the illegal search.‖).  The court in Stith observed that neither the United States Supreme 
Court, nor the New York Court of Appeals has invoked the inevitable discovery rule to pre-
vent the suppression of ―evidence illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequence 
of the challenged police conduct.‖  Id. at 914. 
170 300 N.E.2d 139 (N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 
171 Id. at 141-42 (observing that defendant‘s statements comprised of the primary evi-
dence, but the revelations of those statements were mere derivatives, and thus, admissible 
under the inevitable discovery rule). 
172 Id. at 140. 
173 Id. (―When a knock, an announcement that they were police officers and a telephone 
call from next door produced no answer, the police, acting without a warrant, opened the 
door–which was ajar–went into the house and began searching for the defendant.‖). 
174 Id. (recognizing that defendant ultimately surrendered, shouting from the closet, 
―Don‘t shoot.  I give up.‖). 
175 Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 140. 
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tree doctrine where the normal course of police inves-
tigation would, in any case, even absent the illicit con-
duct, have inevitably led to such evidence.176 
Thus, recognizing that the police had cause to believe defendant was 
at the premises, the court rejected the notion that ―but for the defen-
dant‘s admission, the police would not have looked for incriminating 
evidence in the closet where he had been hiding.‖177 
Furthermore, the court cautioned that ―it may not always be 
certain what the police would have done, clear as it may be what they 
could have or should have done.‖178  In turn, the court remarked that 
the inevitable discovery rule ―may safely be applied–and erosion of 
the salutary exclusionary rule avoided–as long as the prosecution has 
the burden of proving ‗that the illegal act was not a sine qua non of 
the discovery of the otherwise tainted evidence.‘ ‖179  Hence, narrow-
ly restricting the inevitable discovery rule to the realm of derivative 
evidence, the court noted that the gun did not carry the initial taint.180  
Rather, defendant‘s statements constituted the primary evidence and 
the ensuing revelations of those statements yielded derivative evi-
dence.181 
People v. Stith182 again raised the question of the inevitable 
 
176 Id. at 141. 
177 Id. at 142 (noting that weaponry is ―a prime object of any investigation and[] unless 
thrown away[] was certain to be either on or near the defendant‖).  Observing that the closet 
search was inevitable, the court explained that ―it [could] not fairly be said that the police 
exploited the illegality in their interrogation.‖  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
178 Id. 
179 Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 142 (citing MAGUIRE, supra note 50, at 317) (―One cannot 
help but speculate as to the number of cases in which a proper invocation and application of 
these principles might have avoided the unfortunate result of a guilty defendant going free 
merely because of the unlawful act of a police officer.‖)). 
180 Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 142; see People v. Arnau, 444 N.E.2d 13 (N.Y. 1982).   
The court in Arnau observed: 
There can be little doubt that the proper method for resolving Fourth 
Amendment issues, as demonstrated in the aforementioned cases, is to 
examine each phase of the police officers‘ activities as analytically sepa-
rate events and then decide whether the police acted illegally during any 
of those phases.  If such illegal activity is found to have occurred, it must 
then be determined whether or not the evidence seized was come at by 
exploitation of the illegal police activity. 
Id. at 19. 
181 Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d at 142. 
182 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987). 
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discovery rule in the context of a hypothetical inventory search.183  
State troopers initially stopped defendants for speeding.184  Despite 
complying with the request to produce a license, one trooper ordered 
defendants from the truck ―to conduct his own search‖ because they 
could not find the vehicle‘s registration.185  Upon discovering an un-
authorized revolver, defendants were arrested for criminal posses-
sion.186  Thereafter, the troopers also learned that the driver was unli-
censed and the truck was stolen.187 
The search of the vehicle was in fact unlawful, but it was con-
tested that upon conducting a routine registration check, the troopers 
would have learned the truck was stolen, made a lawful arrest, and 
inventoried the vehicle.188  Nevertheless, the court strictly assessed 
the inevitability of events, mandating ―a very high degree of proba-
bility‖ to prevent suppression.189  Furthermore, observing that New 
York State courts ―ha[ve] never applied the rule where, as here, the 
evidence sought to be suppressed is the very evidence obtained in the 
illegal search,‖ the court denied the government‘s inevitable invento-
ry search argument.190 
Thus, the court in Stith established that the inevitable discov-
ery rule is not determinative by merely presuming ―the chain of 
events which would customarily have been set in motion.‖191  Instead, 
as ―failing to exclude wrongfully obtained primary evidence ‗would 
encourage unlawful searches in the hope that probable cause would 
be developed after the fact,‘ ‖ the court mandated that the exclusio-
 
183 Id. at 912. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 912-13. 
188 Id. at 914. 
189 Id. at 913. 
190 Id. at 913-14.  Rejecting the use of the inevitable discovery rule to admit primary evi-
dence, the court stated that: 
[A]dmission in evidence effects what amounts to an after-the-fact purg-
ing of the initial wrongful conduct, and it can never be claimed that a 
lapse of time or the occurrence of intervening events has attenuated the 
connection between the evidence ultimately acquired and the initial mis-
conduct.  The illegal conduct and the seizure of the evidence are one and 
the same. 
Id. at 914. 
191 Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 914. 
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nary rule serve its purpose to bar the directly tainted evidence.192 
Despite similar circumstances in People v. Turriago,193 the 
court‘s mode of analysis was not the same as provided in Stith.194  
Defendant was likewise stopped for a speeding violation, but alleged-
ly consented to a vehicle search whereby the state troopers discov-
ered a corpse.195  Presuming, as defendant urged, consent was in fact 
coerced, the government sought to use the inevitable discovery rule 
to prevent exclusion.196  Because the troopers subsequently ―ran a 
computer check on the status of [] [defendant‘s] license,‖ revealing 
that it was suspended, the government urged that discovery of this 
evidence was inevitable.197 
The court considered trial testimony eliciting that discovery 
was inevitable because ―the New York State Police policy embodied 
in regulations required arresting the driver . . . [and conducting] an 
inventory search of the vehicle and all of its contents.‖198  Given the 
evidence attesting the hypothetical of defendant‘s arrest, the court 
concluded that ―a constitutionally valid, nonpretextual inventory 
search of the van and its contents undoubtedly would have been con-
ducted by the troopers.‖199  In turn, the court in Turriago used the in-
 
192 Id. (quoting State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1264, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975)). 
193 681 N.E.2d 350 (N.Y. 1997). 
194 Compare Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 914 (suppressing the primary evidence and rejecting the 
inevitable inventory discovery proposition), with Turriago, 681 N.E.2d at 356 (determining 
that ―the body of [the victim] would have been discovered through that inventory search and 
that, following the discovery, incriminating secondary evidence‖ would have turned up).  
Interestingly, the ―defendant moved to suppress his statements and the physical evidence 
seized by the police,‖ see id. at 352, but the court merely focused on the fact that incriminat-
ing secondary evidence would have been inevitably discovered without further discussing 
the evidence seized as an immediate effect of the initial illegal search.  Id. at 356.  In addi-
tion, in raising ―considerable authority for applying the inevitable discovery doctrine when 
the proof demonstrates that evidence obtained illegally would certainly have fallen lawfully 
into the hands of the police in the course of a constitutionally valid inventory search,‖ the 
court recites federal precedent and the vast majority of these courts apply the rule to primary 
and secondary evidence.  Id. at 355; see, e.g., Zapata, 18 F.3d at 979 n.7 (suggesting that the 
distinction between these types of evidence, which is presently made by New York courts is 
unsound and unwarranted in the inevitable discovery analysis). 
195 Turriago, 681 N.E.2d at 352. 
196 Id. at 353. 
197 Id. at 352-53. 
198 Id. at 355. 
199 Id.  The court in Turriago reasoned that: 
Based upon such a finding, the suppression court could have further 
found the existence of a very high degree of probability that the body of 
[the victim] would have been discovered through that inventory search 
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evitable discovery rule to save the derivative evidence from suppres-
sion.200 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The court‘s failure to properly apply the inevitable discovery 
rule in Pinckney illuminates that courts need guidance in this area of 
law.201  The divergent approaches employed at the state and federal 
levels have infused more confusion than necessary and endurable in 
modern search and seizure jurisprudence.  So much is manifest in 
―the brevity of the Fourth Amendment and the clarity of its principle 
that the government not be able to arbitrarily interfere in the lives of 
its citizens,‖ and nevertheless, it is apparent that ―the courts have 
struggled to come up with a clear understanding of what constitutes a 
violation of the amendment.‖ 202 
In effect, due to the court‘s misplaced use of the exclusionary 
rule in Pinckney, defendant was released without punishment.  Sup-
pressing the primary evidence was proper given its direct taint from 
the illegal search, consequentially reducing the possession charge.  
Yet, the derivative evidence is admissible under New York State 
precedent and should have sustained a conviction.  Instead, the 
court‘s ruling took the Fourth Amendment to an unintended extreme. 
The officer in Pinckney had legal cause and a professional ob-
ligation to pursue defendant, responding to the scene of an accident.  
Because his license was suspended, a subsequent arrest and lawful 
search was inevitable.  The police action against defendant was not 
overly intrusive.  Given the shifting nature of police authority in a 
contemporary society,203 the dismal claim of a Fourth Amendment 
 
and that, following the discovery, incriminating secondary evidence, i.e., 
evidence not obtained during the invalid consent search [. . .] would also 
have been obtained by the police. 
Turriago, 681 N.E.2d at 356. 
200 Id. at 356 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). 
201 Pinckney, 2011 WL 4011362, at *3. 
202 MCINNIS, supra note 51, at 4-5 (noting as Justice Jackson observed that ―through its 
ability to give meaning to the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court defines in what type of 
society we will live.‖). 
203 See ASCH, supra note 108, at 27 (illuminating the consequence of the vast uncertainties 
underlying search and seizure jurisprudence, as ―[t]he policeman may not act because he has 
not mastered all the intricacies of the increasingly complex criminal law, or it may be that he 
cannot keep up with its volume.‖). 
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violation where an officer simply requests that a suspect remove his 
hands from his pockets undercuts the cardinal rule–the threshold in-
quiry is one of reasonableness.204 
Indeed, the federal and state constitutions bar unreasonable 
search and seizures to protect privacy and security rights.205  Howev-
er, the United States Supreme Court‘s invocation of the inevitable 
discovery rule was justified on its merits–where facts demonstrate 
that evidence was not born exclusively to an unlawful search and sei-
zure, its preservation is proper.  Exclusion of evidence that was 
tainted by an illegal predicate, but inevitably within the reach of po-
lice does not serve as a deterrent.  To the contrary, it hinders prosecu-
torial and law enforcement efforts to proactively fight crime.  Police 
action, whether wrongful or legitimate, has become the scapegoat for 
―unsatisfactory and unjust outcomes in the criminal justice sys-
tem.‖206 
Today, the harsh reality is: ―Damned if you do; damned if you 
don‘t.‖207  Observing the recurring issues and ambiguities in this con-
text, the Supreme Court must formally redress the Nix precedent to 
clearly define the contours of the inevitable discovery rule. 
Danielle M. Hansen
*
 
 
 
204 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (acknowledging Justice Scalia‘s 
wise words, explaining that ―sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reason-
ableness under the Fourth Amendment‖). 
205 See supra notes 19 and 20 (observing the express language in both the federal and New 
York State Constitution). 
206 SIGNORELLI, supra note 44, at vii. 
207 Id.; see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974) (―Just as the law does not re-
quire that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require 
that policeman investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever.  The pressures of 
law enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would make such an expectation unrealis-
tic.‖). 
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